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Abstract 
This paper investigates privately and socially optimal patterns of economic development in a two-sector 
endogenous growth model with clean and dirty goods. We consider a second-best ﬁscal policy framework in 
which distortionary taxes jointly inﬂuence economic growth and environmental quality. In this policy 
setting, three conditions produce an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC): (i) dirty output is bounded; (ii) 
clean output grows endogenously; and (iii) growth in the dirty sector reduces growth in the clean sector. 
These conditions do not arise with a consumption externality, but can emerge with a production 
externality. Endogenous labor supply implications are also investigated. Although not necessary for 
producing an EKC, endogenous labor supply provides additional linkages that produce an EKC under 
circumstances in which it would otherwise not appear. 
Keywords: Environmental quality; Endogenous growth; Second-best policy 
1. Introduction 
Is environmental degradation a necessary by-product of economic growth? Or does society take 
action to control pollution as per-capita incomes rise? Encouraging recent evidence suggests that 
countries control the output of many pollutants as their economies grow. Following Grossman 
and Krueger [12,13] and Seldon and Song [29], a vast empirical literature has emerged to detail 
what has become known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between income and environmental degradation.1 
The idea of an EKC has intuitive appeal. At early stages of industrial development, individuals 
may be more interested in the creation of jobs and income than in the preservation of air and 
water quality, while at later stages, individuals may value the environment more highly and take 
measures to protect it. Yet, the empirical evidence on the EKC merely describes the relationship 
between income and various environmental variables, without providing any explanation. This 
leaves open the questions of why an EKC develops, and whether the relation between pollution 
and income has any normative implications for policy. 
A sizeable theoretical literature has developed to explain the EKC. In this literature, a non-
monotonic relationship between income and pollution arises through various mechanisms that 
shift either pollution supply or pollution demand over time. Copeland and Taylor [8] group this 
literature into four broad categories: (i) sources of growth, which shift pollution supply through 
composition effects in the economy that favor dirty techniques in early stages of development and 
favor clean techniques later on; (ii) income effects, which shift pollution demand in response to 
changes in per-capita income; (iii) threshold effects, which occur when pollution-control 
incentives increase smoothly from an initial corner solution; and (iv) increasing returns to 
abatement, which allow richer economies to abate at lower average cost than poorer ones. 
Although most papers in this literature allow for the possibility of endogenous economic growth, 
none of the models rely on this feature in any way to produce the EKC. Rather, the economy is 
predisposed in each case towards a particular combination of pollution supply and demand 
effects. 
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we provide an explanation for the EKC that depends 
fundamentally on endogenous economic growth. An advantage of this approach is that the 
central forces that generate the EKC emerge endogenously as equilibrium outcomes in the model, 
which isolates the various aspects of the economy that support and hinder development of the 
EKC. Second, we clarify the role of ﬁscal policy in guiding the economy through a non-
monotonic pattern of environmental degradation over time. Understanding this linkage between 
optimal ﬁscal policy, environmental quality, and income is important because an arbitrary 
dynamic tax policy is unlikely to produce the EKC. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
relatively wealthy countries, which tend to have cleaner urban air and cleaner river basins than 
middle-income and poorer countries, also have more stringent environmental regulations and 
stricter enforcement of environmental laws. We consider optimal ﬁscal policy in a second-best 
framework with distorting taxes, which allows us to address the normative implications of the 
EKC in a realistic policy setting where corrective taxes jointly inﬂuence economic growth and 
environmental quality.2 
Our mechanism for the EKC relates to endogenous growth as follows. The economy is 
comprised of two goods-producing sectors, which we label ‘‘clean’’ and ‘‘dirty.’’ Production in 
each sector relies on inputs of capital, labor, and environmental quality. Capital employed in the 
1 For a survey of this literature, see Levinson [20]. 
2 This extends a growing body of research that examines second-best policy design in static, two-sector models with 
distorting taxes (for a survey, see [10]). Our focus is quite different from this, however, and we conﬁne attention to the 
dynamic elements of policy design by suppressing double-dividend issues. 
dirty sector degrades environmental quality, whereas capital employed in the clean sector 
does not. The connection between endogenous growth and the EKC occurs when capital 
used in the dirty sector generates externalities that impact productivity in each sector.3 
The production externality in the dirty sector creates decreasing returns to scale over 
the reproducible inputs, which bounds dirty output, while the production externality in the 
clean sector implies that dirty capital accumulation slows the endogenous growth rate of clean 
output. As a result, investment in dirty capital increases future dirty consumption through a level 
effect, but decreases future clean consumption through a growth effect. The socially optimal stock 
of dirty capital balances the dynamic trade-off between these offsetting effects. Endogenous 
growth is important, because the cost associated with a given decrement in the clean growth rate 
depends on the size of the temporal consumption base in the clean sector, so that the outcome of 
this trade-off evolves smoothly over time as growth gradually alters the relative stock of clean 
capital and dirty capital in the economy. In the scenario that produces the EKC, the dirty sector is 
sufﬁciently large relative to the clean sector that accumulation of dirty capital is initially 
worthwhile, but unbounded endogenous growth of clean output also occurs. Pollution at ﬁrst 
increases to favor production of the more valued dirty output, then declines, as economic growth 
causes the clean sector to acquire a larger share of total consumption, raising the social cost of 
pollution. 
The model relates to threshold effects models of the EKC in the sense that the non-monotonic 
relationship between pollution and income operates through an evolving tension between sectoral 
margins. However, there are several notable differences. In threshold effects models, the incentive 
to control pollution grows monotonically over time, but abatement expenditures remain at zero 
for a number of periods until the economy passes a discrete threshold that triggers investment. In 
John and Pecchenino [15], abatement policy is not implemented until a threshold is breached, 
while in Jones and Manuelli [18] a discrete change in the tax system occurs. In Stokey [30], 
pollution taxes increase monotonically, but a corner solution obtains for sufﬁciently low levels of 
the tax. In our model, the EKC is not triggered by a discrete event. Instead, the EKC emerges 
through a continuous adjustment in the way environmental policy is administered. The optimal 
ﬁscal policy involves a non-monotonic time path for the tax on dirty capital and implements a 
non-trivial shift from taxes on the clean sector to taxes on the dirty sector as the economy moves 
through the EKC. 
Our mechanism for the EKC is most similar to the threshold effect derived by Tahvonen 
and Salo [31] in a two-sector model with renewable and non-renewable energy sources. In 
their model, economic growth shifts the demand for nonrenewable resources outward over 
time at a non-increasing rate, while marginal extraction costs are stock-dependent and adjust 
over time at a rate that compounds with cumulative extraction. In early periods, the shift 
in demand exceeds the shift in supply, so that nonrenewable resource use (and pollution) 
increases, but eventually a threshold is met at which the shift in supply coincides with the 
shift in demand, marking the peak of the EKC. The essential difference here is that the evolving 
margin depends not on stock-dependent costs, but on endogenous growth. This feature produces 
an endogenous threshold for the EKC in which the timing and the magnitude of the 
3 There is considerable empirical evidence to support the role of environmental quality as a factor of production (see, 
e.g., [3,25]). 
environmental decline, and even the emergence or non-emergence of an EKC, depends on a set of 
identiﬁable economic conditions, such as the relative level of capitalization in the clean and dirty 
sectors, the endogenous growth potential in the clean sector, and the manner in which 
environmental quality creates value in the economy. 
The linkage between endogenous growth and the environment provides insights into the types 
of features that underlie the EKC. We identify three conditions that must hold simultaneously for 
an EKC to emerge: (i) dirty output is bounded; (ii) clean output grows endogenously; and (iii) 
growth in the dirty sector reduces the growth rate in the clean sector. One implication of this 
requirement is that an EKC can occur under a production externality, but not under a 
consumption externality. This ﬁnding is consistent with the empirical literature, where almost all 
studies agree that an EKC exists for environmental pollutants with a signiﬁcant connection to 
human health, such as water pollution, sanitation, sulphur dioxide ðSO2Þ; oxides of nitrogen 
ðNOxÞ; carbon monoxide (CO), and suspended particulate matter, but not for such forms of 
pollution as municipal waste whose implications for productivity are less clear [6]. 
Our analysis also highlights the potential for the EKC to occur through a new channel that 
emerges in the labor market equilibrium. Under endogenous labor supply, a production 
externality that originates in either of the two sectors reduces marginal factor productivity and 
inﬂuences labor market participation in both sectors. Endogenous labor supply thus facilitates 
intersectoral spillovers that cause a production externality in a single sector of the economy to 
simultaneously affect productivity in all sectors, which indirectly produces all three necessary 
conditions for the EKC. Consequently, the EKC emerges in an economy with endogenous labor 
in cases where it would not otherwise occur. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal structure of 
the model, which we construct to allow closed-form expressions for various aspects of the 
economy, including the private-sector decision rules and the long-run values of the optimal tax 
rates. Section 3 investigates economic dynamics and describes the features that support the EKC 
in a context that suppresses the constraints facing a Ramsey planner. Section 4 derives conditions 
for the long-run social optimum and employs numerical simulation techniques to characterize the 
transitional dynamics associated with the EKC.4 A brief discussion follows on the role of 
endogenous labor supply in model. 
2. The model 
The economy consists of two production sectors, clean and dirty, that manufacture different 
goods using inputs of capital, labor, and environmental quality. The capital stock that produces 
the ﬁrst type of good generates pollution, whereas capital used to produce the second type of good 
does not. Throughout the analysis, we refer to the good whose production generates pollution as 
the ‘‘dirty’’ good and use the term ‘‘clean’’ good to designate the other. 
4 Our simulation routine is similar to that of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin [24], who analyze the transitional dynamics 
of a two-sector endogenous growth model without an environmental quality relation. Our approach also relates to that 
of Bovenberg and Smulders [4], who derive analytic expressions for economic transition in a linearized system that 
responds to an arbitrary increase in environmental standards. Our purpose is quite different, however, as our 
simulations are designed to characterize the socially optimal development path. 
The economy has both positive and negative externalities. The positive externality arises 
through a learning-by-doing structure that links the aggregate stock of physical capital in each 
sector to the stock of human capital in that sector. This structure implies that sectoral growth 
rates are endogenous, which is a key feature of our model for producing the EKC. The negative 
externality arises from capital used to produce the dirty good, as this generates pollution. 
Pollution degrades environmental quality, which at least potentially hinders the ability of each 
sector to produce goods and reduces amenity values in the economy. 
The regulator seeks to internalize the effects of pollution and human capital in the economy 
through the use of distorting taxes on sectoral capital investment and income. In this section, we 
describe these elements in greater detail. 
2.1. The private sector 
The private sector consists of many identical, inﬁnitely lived agents who act both as producers 
and as consumers of goods. The representative agent acquires instantaneous utility at time t 
through the consumption of goods, ct; and through environmental amenities, et; but derives 
disutility from contributions of labor, lt; according to 
N X 
bt½logðct � BhtlgÞ þ  E logðe%tÞ�; ð1Þt
 
t¼0
 
where 0obo1; 0oB; 1og and 0pE: The utility speciﬁcation employed in (1) follows Hercowitz 
and Sampson [14] and has the important property that the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and labor supply is independent of the consumption level, which implies that labor 
supply is stationary with respect to changes in the real wage. The ﬁrst term in (1) can be 
interpreted as the reduced form of a more elaborate speciﬁcation that incorporates home 
production, where ht; the household’s stock of human capital, exhibits productivity growth 
proportional to the market rate.5 Accordingly, productivity increases embodied in the 
accumulation of human capital over time have no effect on labor supply because of 
parallel increases in home production. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in this context 
is 1=ðg � 1Þ; with larger values of g corresponding to conditions of relatively inelastic labor supply. 
The second term in (1) represents an amenity value associated with environmental quality, et ¼ e%t; 
where the bar indicates average environmental quality (which is not a choice variable for the 
individual). 
Total consumption, ct; is a composite of consumption goods produced in the dirty and clean 
sectors, which is deﬁned by 
cr rd for tX0; ð2Þct ¼ cc;tcd;t 
where the subscripts d and c indicate dirty and clean goods, respectively, and r þ rd ¼ 1: Thec 
human capital stock is similarly distinguished across sectors, 
rc h
rd for tX0; ð3Þht ¼ hc;t d;t 
5 See Greenwood et al. [11] for further details to support this interpretation. 
which implies diminishing marginal returns to human capital in each sector.6 Total labor allocated 
to dirty and clean production activities is given by 
lt ¼ lc;t þ ld;t for tX0: ð4Þ 
Production in the economy is organized as follows. In sector j; output is created through the 
employment of private inputs of capital and labor and public inputs of environmental quality 
according to 
yjyj;t ¼ A1jka ðhj;tlj;tÞð1�aÞ e% for j ¼ d; c; tX0; ð5Þj;t t 
where 0oA1j; aAð0; 1Þ; and 0pyj for j ¼ d; c: Environmental quality is a productive factor in 
sector j when 0oyj: For expositional convenience, the production functions (5) are associated 
with symmetric factor shares for labor and capital inputs ðad ¼ ac ¼ aÞ:7 Nonetheless, the 
productivity of clean and dirty goods may differ according to the sectoral coefﬁcients ðA1daA1cÞ 
and to the extent in which environmental quality is a productive factor (ydayc). 
In each sector, production is augmented by the accumulation of human capital. Following 
Arrow [1] and Romer [28], the accumulation of human capital is formulated as a process of 
learning by doing, in which knowledge grows proportionally to, and as a by product of, 
cumulative private investments in capital.8 The learning process is distinguished across sectors by 
allowing knowledge to accumulate independently for each type of good, so that knowledge 
improves the productivity of intrasectoral, but not intersectoral, goods. In equilibrium, the level 
of human capital in sector j at time t is given by 
hj;t � k%j;t ¼ kj;t for j ¼ d; c; tX0; ð6Þ 
where k%j;t denotes the average level of capital stock in sector j at time t: In (6), we suppose the 
number of producers is sufﬁciently large so that k%j;t is outside the choice set of the representative 
ﬁrm. With identical ﬁrms, it follows that k%j;t ¼ kj;t; j ¼ d; c in equilibrium. 
The stock of the dirty capital also inﬂuences environmental quality. We assume that the 
equilibrium value of the environment, et ¼ e%t; depends only on the average stock of dirty capital 
at time t: This relationship between dirty capital and the environment has two salient features: (i) 
dirty capital pollutes, whereas labor allocated to the dirty sector does not; and (ii) the 
environment serves as a limited sink for waste. The latter feature implies that, for sufﬁciently low 
levels of dirty capital, the ﬂow of pollution is less than the assimilative capacity of the 
environment, so that a marginal increase in dirty production has no adverse affect on 
environmental quality. For levels of dirty capital above the assimilative capacity of the 
environment, the pollution ﬂow exceeds the level of the environmental sink, and spillovers occur 
through the consumption and production channels that comprise (1) and (5). Letting ep denote a 
6 For tractability, we specify symmetric composites for consumption and human capital in (2) and (3). If this 
assumption is relaxed, the model produces differential rates of growth for its consumption and human capital 
components and ultimately forces labor to a corner. 
7 Allowing different factor shares across the two sectors ðadaacÞ does not qualitatively change the results. These 
details are available from the authors upon request. 
8 We choose the simplest possible mechanism for endogenous growth to focus the model on the dynamic tension 
between consumption growth and environmental quality. 
pristine state of the environment, environmental quality is deﬁned by 
% s et ¼ MinfA2k� ; epg; ð7Þd;t 
where 0oA2; 0os; epAð0; NÞ and in equilibrium k%d;t ¼ kd;t: In (7), levels of dirty capital at or 
1 
below the critical value kˆd ¼ ðA2Þs are associated with a pristine environment. For values of dirty ep 
capital above kˆd; environmental quality is inversely related to the dirty capital stock. 
For many situations, the environmental speciﬁcation (7) deﬁnes two stylized regions of 
economic development. Where applicable, we divide the time horizon into what we refer to as a 
‘‘development region’’ in periods t ¼ 0; y; tˆ; and an ‘‘advanced region’’ in periods 
t ¼ tˆþ 1; y; N:9 In the development region, polluting capital stocks are small relative to the 
size of the environmental sink, kd;tokˆd; and dirty capital accumulation has no environmental 
implications. If dirty capital grows in the development region, then at some date tˆ (determined by 
the model parameters) kd;ˆ ¼ kˆd and the economy enters the advanced region of development. In t 
the advanced region, the negative externality channels in (1) and (5) increase the social cost of 
further dirty growth.10 
To complete the speciﬁcation of the private market, we follow [14] and formulate the dynamic 
process of capital accumulation as 
kj;tþ1 ¼ A3jk1�did for j ¼ d; c; tX0 ð8Þj;t j;t 
where 0odp1: The evolution of the capital stock in (8) reﬂects an adjustment cost character to 
new investment similar to that described in Lucas and Prescott [21]. 
Agents in the private sector take initial endowments of dirty and clean capital stocks, kj;0; j ¼ 
Nd; c; as given and choose fcj;t; lj;t; ij;t; kj;tþ1; j ¼ d; cg to maximize (1) subject to (2)–(5), (8), and t¼0 
the sectoral budget constraints 
cj;t þ ð1 þ tj;tÞij;t ¼ ð1 � ty;tÞyj;t for j ¼ d; c; tX0; ð9Þ 
where ty;t is the income tax and tj;t; j ¼ d; c are sector-speciﬁc investment taxes levied on dirty 
and clean capital units at time t:11 The speciﬁcation of the sectoral budget constraints in (9) 
simpliﬁes the model by allowing the two sectors to inﬂuence each other only through the 
environmental externality and through consumer involvement in the labor market. Together with 
the government budget constraint given by (14) below, this speciﬁcation eliminates the possibility 
that income in one sector is used, temporarily, to cross-subsidize development of the other. 
9 Such terminology is appropriate for situations in which the dirty capital stock grows for kd;tokˆd and upon passing 
kˆd never again falls below it. We show below this will be the outcome for all optimal policy situations in which dirty 
capital grows for kd;tokˆd; including the interesting one associated with the EKC. 
10 The environmental sink serves two main purposes in the model. First, it creates an initial development region that 
allows clean and dirty capital stocks to grow endogenously to various levels at tˆ: At this time, the forces that guide 
development in the advanced economy would be identical if we considered, instead, a model which began with an 
exogenous capital endowment. Second, the environmental sink is convenient for simulation purposes, as it stabilizes the 
dirty sector at a long-run steady-state when the long-run social optimum involves pristine environmental quality. 
11 We do not constrain the respective tax instruments to be non-negative, which allows us to consider cases in which 
subsidization is optimal (e.g., a sector j investment tax credit). 
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2.2. The private-sector decision rules 
The private-sector decision rules for investment, consumption, and labor are 
ð1 � ty;tÞ 
ij;t ¼ a yj;t for j ¼ d; c; ð10Þ ð1 þ tj;tÞ
cj;t ¼ ð1 � ty;tÞð1 � aÞyj;t for j ¼ d; c; ð11Þ 
lj;t ¼ rj lt; ð12Þ 8 
1 > < ðGð1 � ty;tÞeY p Þgþa�1 for kd;tpkˆd; 
lt ¼ ð13Þ1 > : ðAYGð1 � ty;tÞk�sYÞgþa�1 for kd;t4kˆd;2 d;t 
bda 1�a 1�a r 1�a 12where a ¼ 1�bð1�dÞ; G ¼ Bg ðA1crc Þ c ½A1drd �rd ; and Y ¼ ½ycrc þ ydrd�:
Several features of these decision rules are important. First, notice that the consumption and 
investment decision rules in (10) and (11) are functions of current tax rates only. This implies that 
there are no anticipation effects in the private-sector decision rules and, consequently, no time 
inconsistency issues in the social program that incorporates them. Second, notice that 
environmental quality enters the labor decision rule directly in (13) through the production 
externality. An increase in the dirty capital stock beyond kd;ˆ ¼ kˆd decreases environmental t 
quality, which reduces marginal factor productivity and correspondingly decreases the 
equilibrium rate of labor market participation. The scaling factor for this equilibrium labor 
market response, Y; is a weighted average of sectoral production externalities linked to labor 
supply through the composite consumption good. Under endogenous labor supply, a production 
externality in one sector jointly inﬂuences production in all goods-producing sectors of the 
economy. 
2.3. The government sector 
The government engages in two types of activities. First, the government purchases goods at a 
level denoted by gtX0; which are non-productive. The level of government purchases is the 
outcome of a political process not explicitly modeled here, and this may include the provision of 
other public goods not central to the present model (e.g., national defense). Second, the 
government engages in corrective policy designed to address the pollution externalities and a 
human-capital externality. The ﬁrst activity, which is not essential to the model, is suppressed by 
treating the level of government goods purchases to be exogenous to the regulator. 
The government regulator manages the externalities with three tax instruments, an income tax, 
ty;t; and sectoral capital investment taxes, tj;t; j ¼ d; c: In general, the positive human-capital 
externality requires subsidies to sectoral capital investment while the negative environmental 
externalities require an off-setting tax on dirty capital investment. The government regulator 
12 The derivation of these rules, as well as other analytical results in the paper, are contained in a technical appendix 
that is available from the authors upon request. 
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ﬁnances these corrective policies, as well as the (exogenous) level of non-productive spending, 
through the use of the income tax. We assume the government runs a balanced budget at each 
date, 
gt ¼ tc;tic;t þ td;tid;t þ ty;tðyc;t þ yd;tÞ for tX0: ð14Þ 
The speciﬁcation of a period-by-period balanced budget constraint in (14) facilitates the analysis 
of optimal ﬁscal policy in a second-best setting. Without this temporal budget balance, a dynamic 
Ramsey planner would use intertemporal government savings to levy arbitrarily large taxes on the 
initial capital endowment, which is inelastically supplied, then disburse these assets through 
capital and income subsidies for the remainder of time.13 Although this is an interesting 
possibility, we believe the period-by-period budget balance constraint comes closer to the type of 
budget constraint actually facing environmental policy makers. 
Finally, we assume that non-productive government spending grows in proportion to the total 
level of output according to gt ¼ fðyc;t þ yd;tÞ; where fX0: Under this restriction, spending 
remains a constant share of output over time, so that f can be interpreted as an administrative 
loss parameter. If the government sector entails no administrative loss ðf ¼ 0Þ; then the model 
reduces to one in which taxes and subsidies serve a purely corrective role. 
3. Fiscal policy and economic dynamics 
In this section we investigate how ﬁscal policy impacts output and growth in the development 
and advanced regions. In the ﬁrst subsection, no restrictions are placed on policy, so the 
implications can be interpreted as the outcome of an arbitrary exogenous policy. Next we derive 
the implications of a constant ﬁscal policy program. By focusing on exogenous policy we are able 
to illustrate the fundamental tensions of the economy arising from the pollution and learning-by­
doing externalities. In Section 4, we examine the problem of a Ramsey planner who weighs each 
of these tensions, and, in so doing, may design ﬁscal policy to create an EKC. 
3.1. Production and growth implications 
Substitution of (13) and (12) into (5) yields equilibrium output in sector j of 8 
1�a > ej< Djð1 � ty;tÞgþa�1ep kj;t for kd;tpkˆd; 
yj;t ¼ ð15Þ1�a > : ej �sejA Djð1 � ty;tÞgþa�1k kj;t for kd;t4kˆd;2 d;t 
1�a 1�awhere Dj ¼ A1jrj G and ej ¼ yj þ Y gþa�1 X0 for j ¼ d; c: Two features of (15) deserve 
emphasis. First, a consumption externality does not affect output, whereas a production 
externality does. This is because private consumption and environmental quality are separable 
components of utility. Second, notice that the production externality enters each output 
expression through both a direct component, yj; and an indirect component that depends on the 
13 See, for example, [16]. 
magnitude of the composite environmental production effect, Y: Even in the case in which the 
environment is not necessary for the production of good j ðyj ¼ 0Þ; the level of environmental 
quality nonetheless has real economic effects on the equilibrium output in sector j when a 
production externality affects the other good. This feedback occurs as a result of a labor market 
equilibrium with endogenous labor supply. When labor supply is endogenous in (13), the labor 
market allocation responds to various features of the economy that inﬂuence its marginal return, 
including the income tax rate, and in the case of a production externality, the level of 
environmental quality. Under a production externality, the environment has a positive effect on 
labor market productivity in at least one sector of the economy, so that a decline in environmental 
quality results in a smaller equilibrium labor market allocation, reducing output in both sectors. 
The indirect component of the production externality in (15) incorporates both production 
sectors, as each sector competes for the common labor input. 
An expression for the growth rate at time t can be obtained by substituting (15) into (10) and 
combining this expression with (8). This yields 8 
dg > dej< A3jðaDjÞdð1 � ty;tÞgþa�1ð1 þ tj;tÞ�d ep � 1 for kd;tpkˆd; ¼ ð16Þmj;t dg > dej dej �sdej: A2 A3jðaDjÞd et ð1 � ty;tÞgþa�1ð1 þ tj;tÞ�dkd;t � 1 for kd;t4kˆd; 
kj;tþ1�kj;twhere mj;t � kj;t denotes the sector j growth rate. Notice that each sector obtains balanced 
growth under constant tax policy in the development region, as kd;tpkˆd for tptˆ: In the advanced 
region of the economy ðt4tˆ Þ; the sectoral growth rates decline with dirty capital accumulation 
ˆwhenever the stock of dirty capital exceeds kd: Nonetheless, the clean sector obtains balanced 
growth under constant taxes for any steady-state level of dirty capital ðkd;t ¼ kd;ssÞ: We elaborate 
on this possibility in the following section. 
Expression (16) also reveals the relative growth rate of the clean and dirty sectors. For example, 
in an economy characterized by symmetric environmental production externalities ðyd ¼ yc ¼ yÞ; 
the sectoral growth rates satisfy 
# $ 1 # $1�a
A1c A3c d rc 1 þ tc;t
 m vmd;t3 v : ð17Þc;t A1d A3d rd 1 þ td;t 
If the ﬁscal policy does not discriminate between capital types ðtc;t ¼ td;t ¼ ttÞ; then dirty output 
growth exceeds that of clean output growth in (17) for various combinations of the following 
circumstances: (i) the dirty industry is more productive than the clean industry ðA1coA1dÞ; (ii) 
dirty capital is more readily created than clean capital ðA3coA3dÞ; and (iii) dirty goods are more 
highly valued in consumption ðr ordÞ: Each case is consistent with an economy that, absent c
environmental externalities, devotes the majority of its resources to production of the dirty good. 
3.2. Constant ﬁscal policy 
In this section we examine economic behavior under constant ﬁscal policy. Under constant 
taxes, the dynamics of the model depend on the level of economic development. In the initial 
development region tptˆ; the stock of dirty capital is sufﬁciently low that the environment fully 
assimilates all pollution so that et ¼ ep and balanced growth occurs in each sector according to 
(16). If the dirty sector growth rate is positive in the development region (the interesting case), 
then the stock of dirty capital eventually reaches kd;tˆ ¼ kˆd at date tˆ: At this time, the economy 
ˆenters the advanced region. Accumulation of dirty capital beyond kd degrades the environment 
and inﬂuences utility through the negative externality channels that enter utility directly in (1) and 
indirectly through private consumption in (11) and (15). 
In the advanced region of development ðt4tˆ Þ; sectoral productivity depends on the nature of 
the externality. Under a pure consumption externality ðE40; ej ¼ 0 for j ¼ c; dÞ; production in 
each sector involves constant returns over the reproducible factors for all kd;t4kˆd and 
consequently a balanced growth rate holds in (16) for both sectors, regardless of the level of 
dirty capital. Depending on the private value of each type of good and on the level of taxes, the 
balanced growth rate in each sector is positive, negative, or zero. If taxes are set to encourage both 
types of capital creation in the advanced economy, then a pattern of industrial development arises 
that is characterized by balanced growth of clean and dirty goods and a perpetual decline in 
environmental quality for all t4tˆ: 
Under a production externality ðej40 for j ¼ c; d), two salient features emerge in the 
advanced economy ðt4tˆ Þ: First, investment that increases the stock of dirty capital to 
kd;t4kˆd negatively affects productivity and growth in the clean sector when ec40: This implies 
that the potential for endogenous growth in the clean sector depends on the time path for dirty 
capital in the advanced economy. Endogenous growth of clean output may occur in (16) under 
pristine environmental quality that otherwise would not occur at lower levels of environmental 
quality. Second, the dirty sector exhibits bounded growth when ed40; as this entails decreasing 
returns to scale over the reproducible inputs for kd;t4kˆd: The model thus produces Solow-type 
dynamics in (16) that ultimately lead the dirty capital stock to a steady state for any levels of the 
taxes. Moreover, with endogenous labor supply, ed40 even when environmental quality is 
entirely non-productive in the creation of dirty goods (i.e., yd ¼ 0Þ; and ec40 even when 
environmental quality is entirely non-productive in the creation of clean goods (i.e., yc ¼ 0). This 
conclusion holds because a production externality links sectoral outputs through the labor supply 
decision (13). 
Under a production externality, the steady-state equilibrium in the dirty goods sector is found 
by substituting (15) and (10) into (8). Making use of the steady-state condition kd;tþ1 ¼ kd;t ¼ 
kd;ss; 
1 1 1 �1g 
kd;ss ¼ ðA3dÞdsed ðA2ÞsðaDdÞsed ð1 � tyÞsed ðgþa�1Þð1 þ tdÞsed : ð18Þ 
Notice that an increase in either the income tax or the tax on dirty capital reduces the steady-state 
equilibrium level of dirty capital. 
A steady-state level of the dirty capital stock implies a corresponding steady state for 
environmental quality. Substituting (18) into (8), we obtain 
�1 �g�1 1
ded edðgþess ¼ A ðaDdÞ ed ð1 � tyÞ a�1Þð1 þ tdÞed : ð19Þ3d 
To characterize the effect of the ﬁscal policy parameters on clean-sector growth, substitute (19) 
into (16) and set ty;t ¼ ty and tc;t ¼ tc: This produces a balanced growth rate in the clean sector 
% # $ & 
given by 
�ec �dec dgðyd�ycÞ dec 
m ¼ A3cðaDcÞdA ed ðaDdÞ ed ð1 � tyÞedðgþa�1Þð1 þ tdÞ ed ð1 þ tcÞ�d � 1: ð20Þc 3d 
Notice in (20) that the production externality manifests itself through two independent tax 
incentives. First, an increase in the tax on dirty capital reduces the steady-state stock of dirty 
capital in (18), which improves environmental quality and increases the rate of clean output 
growth. Second, an increase in the income tax, ty; proportionally reduces both types of investment 
in (10). The direct effect of a higher income tax is to reduce clean sector growth, but its indirect 
effect is to decrease the steady-state level of the stock of dirty capital in (18), which improves 
environmental quality and facilitates clean growth. The overall impact of an increase in the 
income tax depends on the distribution of the production effect across the two sectors. If yc4yd; 
the indirect effect dominates the direct effect, and a larger income tax actually stimulates 
investment and growth in the clean sector. 
4. Optimal ﬁscal policy and the EKC 
We consider a dynamic tax structure that originates from the class of second-best optimal 
policy programs ﬁrst considered by Ramsey [27].14 The policy structure is one in which the 
regulator is a dominant market participant who takes the private-sector decision rules, the market 
equilibrium conditions, and the various externalities as constraints in the social program. The 
regulator’s optimization problem is formulated as the selection of choice variables 
N Nfcj;t; lj;t; ij;t; kj;tþ1; j ¼ d; cg and policy variables fty;t; tj;t; j ¼ d; cg to maximize (1) subject t¼0 t¼0 
to (2)–(13). 
It is analytically convenient to eliminate variables in the objective function through substitution 
of the constraints. Speciﬁcally, it is possible to reduce the social program to one in which the 
regulator chooses a sequence of optimal values fty;t; kj;tþ1; j ¼ d; c; tX0g; which are then used to 
N Nrecover the sequence of allocations fcj;t; lj;t; ij;t; j ¼ d; cg and policy variables ftj;t; j ¼ d; cgt¼0 t¼0 
that comprise the social optimum. Making use of the private-market decision rules (10)–(13), the 
social problem is to 
N X 
bt 
gð1 � aÞ þ a � 1 r rdcMax log ð1 � ty;tÞyc;tyd;t þ E logðetÞ ð21Þ ty;t ;kj;tþ1 gt¼0 
subject to the government budget constraint, 
gt ¼ ½a þ ð1 � aÞty;t�ðyc;t þ yd;tÞ � ic;t � id;t; ð22Þ 
and the private-market equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (15). 
The Ramsey planner takes the level of government spending as exogenous. The government 
revenue needed at each date is a constant faction of output, gt ¼ fðydt þ yctÞ; but this is treated as 
14 There has been considerable recent work investigating these kinds of programs, including Lucas and Stokey [22], 
Jones et al. [16,17], Zhu [32], and Cassou and Lansing [5]. 
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exogenous to the regulator by incorporating this information as an equilibrium condition after the 
ﬁrst-order conditions are derived.15 
Substituting (7), (8), and (15) into (21) and (22), the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for this 
problem are 
@Lgð�Þ g ' 
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: ½a þ ð1 � aÞty;t�ðyc;t þ yd;tÞ �  ic;t � id;t ¼ gt: ð26Þ 
@lg;t 
The ﬁrst-order conditions for sectoral capital accumulation in (24) and (25) describe similar 
consumption and investment considerations in the development region. In the advanced region of 
the economy, however, external effects emerge in (25) for kd;t4kˆd that inﬂuence the marginal 
utility of dirty goods under a consumption externality ðE40Þ and both the marginal utility and 
15 This is in the spirit of Ramsey [27], where government revenue needs are exogenous and taxes are selected so as to 
acheive the exogenous revenue need at a minimum welfare loss. 
the marginal productivity of dirty capital investment under a production externality (Y40 and 
ej40 for j ¼ d; c). The nonlinearity of the dirty capital investment condition at kˆd introduces 
dynamics that depend on the level of the stock of dirty capital, which makes closed-form solutions 
for the ﬁscal policy decision rules possible in only a limited range of circumstances. 
In the following sections, we ﬁrst investigate optimal ﬁscal policy under a consumption 
externality, then extend this analysis to consider a production externality. Throughout, we conﬁne 
attention to circumstances in which the optimal policy generates endogenous growth in each 
sector during the development region of the economy. 
4.1. A consumption externality 
Consider the case in which environmental quality contributes only amenity value in the 
economy ðE40 and ej ¼ 0 for j ¼ d; cÞ: In this case, (15) implies constant returns to the 
reproducible factors of production in both sectors, and endogenous growth is therefore feasible 
for both sectors in the advanced region. Given that endogenous growth of the clean sector is 
desirable in the development region, it remains so in the advanced economy. Endogenous growth 
in the dirty sector may no longer occur at time tˆ; however, as the Ramsey planner responds to the 
consumption externality by adjusting the tax rates, ty;t and td;t; to reduce, and potentially 
eliminate growth in the dirty sector. 
The following pattern of economic development emerges under a consumption externality. In 
the development region ðtptˆ Þ; the Ramsey planner encourages growth by providing tax 
incentives to both sectors of the economy. Accumulation of dirty capital occurs at a positive rate 
until, at some time tˆ (determined by model parameters), kd;tˆ ¼ kˆd; and the consumption 
externality sets in. At time tˆ; the marginal social beneﬁt of dirty capital investment on tˆþ 1 
consumption falls to bðrd � sEÞv0 in (25) to account for environmental amenity values. Notice 
that the marginal social beneﬁt of dirty consumption does not depend on any of the state variables 
in the model. This implies that the condition that determines whether or not continued 
endogenous growth of dirty output is socially desirable in the advanced economy remains 
identical for all kd;t: One of two outcomes occurs in the advanced region ðtXtˆ Þ: First, for 
sufﬁciently large values of the consumption externality ðrdpsEÞ; the marginal social beneﬁt of 
dirty capital is (at least weakly) negative for all kd;tXkˆd and the Ramsey planner immediately 
adjusts the tax rates at tˆ to maintain a pristine level of environmental quality for the remainder of 
time. Second, for less extreme values of the consumption externality ðrd4sEÞ; continued 
endogenous growth in the dirty sector may be optimal at tˆ: If so, endogenous output growth in the 
dirty sector remains optimal for all tXtˆ; and environmental quality declines asymptotically over 
time. Under either outcome, an EKC does not occur. 
4.2. Production externality 
Next consider the case in which environmental quality has only productive effects (E ¼ 0 and 
ej40 for some j ¼ d; c). In this case, several terms appear in the dirty capital investment condition 
(25) at time tˆ: The production externality now inﬂuences social investment in dirty capital both 
through a utility component, Y; and through sectoral productivity components, ec and ed: The 
utility component operates in a manner similar to a consumption externality; indeed, if this was 
the only effect, the two forms of externality would be isomorphic. The sectoral productivity 
components differ in that they affect sectoral output levels. This creates state-dependent effects 
which are central to our explanation of the EKC. 
The following pattern of economic development emerges under a production externality. In the 
initial development region ðtptˆ Þ; the optimal policy encourages growth in both sectors of the 
economy until, at time tˆ; the stock of dirty capital reaches kd;ˆ ¼ kˆd and the economy enters the t 
advanced region of development. Several possibilities occur at this time. One possibility is that the 
regulator immediately sets taxes to curb dirty sector growth. Maintaining the stock of dirty capital 
at kd
� 
;ss ¼ kˆd preserves a pristine environment, and this minimizes the drag that dirty capital places 
on the endogenous growth of clean output in (16). To see whether such a policy is optimal, 
consider defections from it. There are two types of defections: one that ‘‘tightens’’ environmental 
policy by raising taxes on dirty capital; and one that ‘‘loosens’’ environmental policy by reducing 
taxes on dirty capital.16 A tightened environmental policy is clearly sub-optimal at tˆ; because this 
would reduce the dirty capital stock below kˆd without improving environmental quality, and we 
have assumed dirty growth to be optimal for a stock of dirty capital below kˆd: 
The remaining possibility is a defection that temporarily loosens environmental policy. Under 
this scenario, dirty investment continues at tˆ at a level that increases the dirty capital stock at 
tˆþ 1; reducing environmental quality. The marginal beneﬁt of loosening environmental policy is 
the discounted stream of additional dirty consumption injected into the economy by the higher 
dirty capital stock. This beneﬁt enters as a level effect in the dirty sector in the following sense. If 
the regulator permanently adjusts taxes to maintain a stock of dirty capital above kˆd; dynamics of 
the type described in Section 3.2 arise, and the stock of dirty capital approaches a steady state 
given by (18). Growth eventually ceases in the dirty sector, because ed40 implies decreasing 
returns to scale over the reproducible inputs in (15) for kd;t4kˆd: In the long run, only the stock of 
dirty capital, and consequently the level of dirty consumption, are higher under this policy, not the 
long-run rate of dirty growth, so that loosening environmental policy produces only a level effect 
on utility. The marginal cost of loosening environmental policy is the discounted steam of lost 
clean consumption resulting from the higher dirty capital stock. This is a growth effect. If the 
ˆregulator permanently adjusts taxes to maintain a stock of dirty capital stock above kd; 
environmental quality declines, which dampens the long-run endogenous growth rate in the clean 
sector in (16). The social value of this growth effect depends on the size of the clean consumption 
base over which it is compounded. 
The outcome for the economy in the advanced region depends on the dynamic tension between 
the level effect and the growth effect. If the utility value of the growth effect exceeds that of the 
level effect at tˆ; then the planner immediately sets taxes to curb dirty capital accumulation at 
ˆkd;tˆþ1 ¼ kˆd and emphasize clean growth. The dirty capital stock remains at kd while the clean 
capital stock grows between tˆ and tˆþ 1; and this correspondingly increases the magnitude of the 
16 By ‘‘tighten’’ and ‘‘loosen’’, we mean relative to a policy that maintains kd;t ¼ kˆd; not relative to the policy that was 
implemented in the development region. 
growth effect. Thus, the growth effect continues to exceed the level effect for all dates thereafter, 
and the optimal policy maintains a steady-state dirty capital stock of kd
� 
;ss ¼ kˆd: 
If the level effect exceeds the growth effect at tˆ; then the optimal policy at least temporarily 
allows dirty capital to continue growing. The Ramsey planner must then make a nontrivial 
comparison at each date in the advanced economy between the discounted value of the two 
opposing effects arising from dirty capital investment. The dynamic outcome of this trade-off 
depends on the relative size of the clean and dirty temporal consumption base at each date in the 
advanced economy, and, because the temporal consumption base in each sector adjusts over time 
with changes in the capital stocks, the optimal environmental policy also evolves over time. This 
has important implications both for the long-run equilibrium and for the transitional pattern of 
development in an advanced economy. 
4.2.1. The long-run outcome 
The long-run equilibrium under a production externality depends on the dynamic outcome for 
the utility values associated with the growth and level effects. As noted above, if the growth effect 
dominates the level effect at tˆ; then it continues to dominate the level effect for all dates t4tˆ; and 
the economy maintains a steady-state stock of dirty capital of kd
� 
;ss ¼ kˆd: The clean sector grows 
endogenously under pristine environmental quality at its potential rate and the utility value 
associated with the growth effect is unbounded in the long run. 
If the level effect dominates the growth effect at tˆ; then one of two outcomes occurs. Either the 
growth effect never overtakes the level effect (in terms of its utility value), or the growth effect 
eventually surpasses the level effect.17 In the ﬁrst case, the social optimum involves a negative 
long-run growth rate for the clean sector. In the second case, the long-run rate of clean output 
growth is positive. The dynamic outcome that ultimately prevails depends on several features of 
the economy at tˆ; including the social discount rate, the endogenous growth potential in the clean 
sector, the amount of drag environmental degradation places on clean output growth, and the 
relative level capitalization in the clean and dirty sectors. For a given stock of dirty capital at tˆ; a 
larger stock of clean capital narrows the gap between the growth effect and the level effect (in 
utility terms), which makes a positive long-run growth outcome for the clean sector more likely. 
For t4tˆ; the growth effect evolves from its initial position with changes in the size of clean 
consumption base. Ultimately the direction of this change depends on the effective rate of 
endogenous output growth in the clean sector. The effective rate of endogenous growth of clean 
output, which is positive for some levels of dirty capital in the advanced economy but negative for 
others, depends on both the potential rate of clean sector growth under pristine environmental 
conditions and the degree to which dirty capital accumulation dampens clean sector growth in 
(16). The social discount rate maps the level effect and the growth effect into utility terms, and this 
also inﬂuences the outcome because each effect manifests itself differently in the dynamic pattern 
of future consumption. Stimulating growth creates a stream of future consumption that 
compounds indeﬁnitely over time, whereas the level effect facilitates more immediate 
17 There is also a remote possibility that the utility values of the growth and level effects converge to the same point in 
the long-run, so that the clean and dirty capital stocks simultaneously approach a steady-state. This is a zero measure 
outcome, and we choose to ignore it here. 
consumption, so that a more patient planner places greater emphasis on the growth effect than a 
less patient one. 
It may seem that if clean output growth is optimal in the development region it should always 
remain desirable in the advanced economy. This is not the case. The optimality conditions for 
clean and dirty capital investment in (24) and (25) are linked in the advanced economy, which 
raises the standard on how attractive the clean sector must be as a vehicle for sustained 
endogenous output growth. If the level effect exceeds the growth effect at tˆ; then the Ramsey 
planner sets environmental policy to encourage accumulation of dirty capital. In response, 
environmental quality declines at tˆþ 1; dampening the growth rate of clean output. The clean 
sector always grows at tˆ (by assumption), and continues to grow for at least some time in the 
advanced economy. However, if the potential endogenous growth rate in the clean sector is 
sufﬁciently small, then it is possible that environmental degradation reduces the clean growth rate 
below zero before the growth effect can overtake the level effect. Thus, the accumulation of dirty 
capital can crowd out clean sector growth that would otherwise occur without environmental 
feedback. 
If the growth effect does not eventually overtake the level effect, the stock of dirty capital 
ˆremains above kd indeﬁnitely at a level that bounds economic output in both sectors. The 
economy remains trapped below the threshold at which cleaning up pollution makes economic 
sense, and the dirty sector develops to a point where the long-run rate of clean output growth is 
negative.18 
The other possibility is that the social optimum supports a positive rate of endogenous clean 
output growth in the long run. This is the interesting case in which an EKC develops. At time tˆ; 
the level effect exceeds the growth effect and the regulator temporarily encourages accumulation 
of dirty capital. However, because the clean sector obtains unbounded endogenous output 
growth, the growth effect eventually dominates the level effect and, at this point, dirty capital 
disinvestment becomes desirable. The optimal ﬁscal policy that supports positive growth of clean 
output must therefore adjust tax rates in the long run to maintain a pristine environment. The 
long-run dirty capital stock is given by 
# $  1 
s 
kd
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: ð27Þ 
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The long-run equilibrium level of the tax on dirty capital (as a function of the income tax) is 
recovered by substituting (27) into (8) and making use of (10) and (15), 
1 g

d gþa�1e ed
tdðtyÞ ¼ aA Ddð1 � tyÞ � 1:	 ð28Þ3d	 p 
The long-run value of the dirty capital tax in (28) depends on the level of the income tax, as the tax 
incentive necessary to obtain a steady-state stock of dirty capital is determined jointly by these 
two tax rates in (18). Notice that the magnitude of the tax on dirty capital depends only on the 
18 This environmental trap may explain current development patterns in some countries. Although the data indicate 
that many developed countries have gone through an EKC period and now use cleaner production techniques, others 
have not, and our model provides no reassurance that the trend towards increasing pollution levels in these countries 
will change course as per capita income (temporarily) grows. 
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extent of the production externality in the economy. A consumption externality does not affect 
the private-sector decision rules and therefore has no bearing on the equilibrium growth rate of 
dirty output. 
As the clean sector continues to grow at this steady state, the dirty sector becomes an 
increasingly small part of the economy. In the limit, the long-run social optimum satisﬁes the 
equilibrium restrictions 
yd;t
lim -0; ð29Þ 
t-N yc;t 
id;t
lim -0; ð30Þ 
t-N yc;t 
lim gt -fyc;t: ð31Þ 
t-N 
Substitution of these values into the ﬁrst-order conditions (23)–(26) yields 
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The solution to (32)–(34) is 
ic;t ¼ b1yc;t; 
b1 þ f � a að1 � fÞ � b1t� ¼ 40 and t� ¼ o0;y 1 � a c ð1 � aÞb1 
where 
db½r ðg þ a � 1Þ þ ð1 � r Þgf�c cb1 ¼ 40: g½1 � b þ dbr �c
# $ 
Notice that both the income tax rate and the clean capital tax rates approach constant values in 
the long-run equilibrium that do not depend on the coefﬁcients of environmental productivity. 
This is because private and social investment incentives are aligned with respect to the production 
externality at a pristine level of environmental quality. Nonetheless, the Ramsey planner 
implements a corrective tax policy in the clean sector to encourage human capital creation, which 
involves using income tax revenue to ﬁnance a capital investment subsidy in the clean sector.19 
For completeness, the optimal tax on dirty capital investment can be recovered by substituting t� y 
into (28) to obtain 
g
1 1 � b1 � f gþa�1 t� ¼ aAd Dd e ed � 1:d 3d p1 � a 
4.2.2. The short-run outcome and the EKC 
An EKC emerges in the advanced region of the economy if two properties hold. First, as the 
economy enters the advanced region of development, the beneﬁt associated with increasing the 
stock of dirty capital must exceed the cost. Second, the growth rate of clean output must remain 
positive as environmental quality degrades through the upward sloping portion of the EKC until, 
at some point, the utility value of the growth effect coincides with that of the level effect. This 
marks the turning point of the EKC. When both properties hold, the Ramsey planner temporarily 
loosens environmental policy to encourage accumulation of dirty capital at time tˆ; and 
environmental quality declines. At some point, the growth effect equals, then surpasses the level 
effect, and the planner responds by temporarily tightening environmental policy, compeling 
agents to divest dirty capital to the long-run steady-state level, k� ¼ kˆd: Environmental quality d;ss 
trends smoothly back to the pristine level in response. 
The remainder of this section illustrates the possibility of an EKC through numerical 
simulation. Parameters in the baseline simulation are selected according to several criteria. First, 
to avoid extreme solutions, environmental parameters are chosen to entail relatively modest 
productivity impacts in the economy. Second, the parameters that describe consumer preferences 
and clean sector productivity are selected to match the long-run balanced growth path of the 
model to several observed features of the US economy. Third, to provide a baseline simulation, 
symmetric parameters are chosen for dirty-sector productivity so that the initial growth incentives 
are equal across sectors in the development region. In later simulations, we compare the dynamic 
implications of this baseline calibration with results derived from alternative parameterizations of 
the model in which the dirty sector is either more productive than the clean sector or produces a 
good with relatively more desirable consumptive qualities. 
The environmental parameters are selected as follows. First, to generate a modest impact of the 
environment on production, we choose yd ¼ yc ¼ 0:05: Second, we choose a pristine level of 
environmental quality represented by the unit value ðep ¼ 1Þ; and, ﬁnally, we select parameters 
relating the sensitivity of the environment to the dirty capital stocks to satisfy s ¼ 1 and A2 ¼ 1: 
This implies a long-run steady-state value of the dirty capital stock given by kd
� 
;ss ¼ 1: 
19 The tax on dirty capital provides an insigniﬁcant source of government revenue in the long-run equilibrium; hence, 
it cannot be used to cross-subsidize clean output growth. 
c 
Table 1 
Calibrated parameter values 
Parameter Estimate Calibration target 
r ¼ rd 0.500 NA
 
E 0 NA
 
yc ¼ yd 0.050 NA
 
ep 1 NA
 
s 1 NA
 
A2 1 NA
 
g 1.600 Empirical labor supply elasticity [23].
 
a 0.400 Average share of capital in output [7].
 
f 0.212 Average g=y in the US post-war period.
 
A1c ¼ A1d 1.125 Average k=y ¼ 2:61; (durables/structures/equipment/residential).
 
A3c ¼ A3d 1.129 Average per capita output growth m ¼ 1:80%:
 
d 0.041 Average i=y ¼ 0:22; (durables/structures/equipment/residential).
 
B 0.685 Time in market work 0.33, [19].
 
b 0.979 After-tax interest rate rˆ ¼ 4% [26].a
 
ty 0.231 Chosen to satisfy (22).
 
tc ¼ td �0:084 Effective marginal capital tax rate 0:16 [2].
 
a The after-tax interest rate rˆ is deﬁned by introducing privately issued real bonds (which exist in zero net supply) into 
the household budget constraint. The ﬁrst-order condition for bonds implies rˆ ¼ expðm � ln bÞ � 1: 
The calibration targets and the estimated parameters that comprise the baseline simulation are 
summarized in Table 1. The baseline simulation involves symmetric consumer tastes for clean and 
dirty goods, r ¼ rd ¼ 0:5; and symmetric production elasticities of a ¼ 0:4 as advocated by c 
Cooley and Prescott [7]. The labor supply conditions are described by g ¼ 1:6; which corresponds 
to an intertemporal labor elasticity of 1:7; a value midway in the range of empirical estimates 
reported by Mulligan [23]. The government spending parameter f is set equal to 0:212 to coincide 
with the average ratio of government expenditure to GDP over the 1970–1998 period. The 
remaining parameters that describe preferences and production in the baseline calibration are 
selected simultaneously to match the long run balanced growth path of the model to several 
observed moments of US post-war manufacturing data. 
Fig. 1 presents simulated time paths for the variables that comprise the numerical 
solutions to the dynamic ﬁrst-order conditions (23)–(26) in the baseline calibration 
model.20 The model converges to a steady-state stock of dirty capital, an equilibrium 
rate of balanced clean-sector growth of m ¼ 0:0337; and constant tax rates given by ¼c ty 
0:4846; td ¼ �0:2520; and tc ¼ �0:6687: The long-run growth rate in the clean sector is 
considerably higher than the calibration target for per-capita output growth, which reﬂects the 
20 The model is solved using what a backwards simulation technique. This technique starts at the long run steady state 
and then recursively solves Eqs. (23)–(26) for earlier periods. For these simulations, the end-time conditions were given 
k� ¼ 1; t� ¼ b1þf�a � ¼ b1ð1�bÞ�dbfby k� ¼ 1; 000; ; and l� y : The derivation of the long run expression involving l� canc d;ss y 1�a g c dbr gc 
be found in the technical appendix available from the authors. 
signiﬁcant adjustments that take place in both the tax parameters and the environmental quality 
level at the second-best optimum. 
The socially optimal development path in the baseline simulation is characterized by a notably 
U-shaped pattern of environmental decline and recovery over time. This relationship appears in 
Fig. 1a, which shows the time path of environmental quality. The U-shaped pattern of 
environmental decline and recovery in the panel accords well with the empirical regularity that 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Fig. 1. 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
Fig. 1 (continued). 
pollution at ﬁrst increases then declines with per capita GDP, as Fig. 1b demonstrates a 
monotonic increase in per-capita income over time.21 
An important feature in Fig. 1b is the trend in the sectoral composition of output (and income) 
in the economy. At the beginning of the simulated horizon, the dirty sector is the primary source 
of output in the economy; however, output in the clean sector acquires a larger share of total 
output throughout the simulated horizon, and the time paths cross approximately at the turning 
21 The standard depiction of the EKC plots environmental quality against income. Here, because income increases 
monotonically over the horizon, it is more constructive to view the evolution of each variable over time. 
point of the EKC. This suggests that the EKC may depend not just on per-capita income in a 
country, but also on the composition of output across polluting and non-polluting sectors of the 
economy (e.g., manufacturing and services). 
Fig. 1c illustrates the time paths of the clean and dirty capital stocks. The optimal development 
path is associated with a monotonically increasing clean capital stock over the simulated horizon 
and a non-monotonic time path for the dirty capital stock. After an initial period of accumulation 
of dirty capital, the dirty capital stock adjusts downward to a long-run steady-state value 
associated with a pristine environment. Notice that the dirty capital stock is above the clean 
capital stock at the time the EKC commences, and that environmental quality approaches its 
minimum value in Fig. 1a roughly at the time the capital stocks cross. This indicates the changing 
nature of the trade-off between sectoral margins in the economy at different relative levels of the 
clean and dirty capital stocks. 
Fig. 1d contains time paths for the various tax rates in the economy. Notice that the optimal 
ﬁscal policy involves a nontrivial shift in tax policy for the dirty sector. Initially, investment in 
dirty capital is subsidized at nearly the same rate as clean capital. Unlike the time path for the tax 
on clean capital, however, which is relatively ﬂat, the optimal tax on dirty capital increases over 
time in the development region of the economy. This trend captures an anticipation effect of the 
type described by Farzin [9] for the case of an environmental stock externality.22 Then, at a date 
that roughly corresponds to the minimum level of environmental quality, the optimal tax on dirty 
capital adjusts sharply upward, and subsequently declines to the long-run optimal level. A 
signiﬁcant policy correction is required to produce the EKC, even when the clean and dirty sectors 
are symmetric. 
The relative rate of growth for clean and dirty output in Fig. 1e illustrates how the economic 
development pattern depends on the rates of the investment taxes. Dirty output grows more 
slowly than clean output in the developing region under symmetric conditions because the planner 
anticipates the change in social investment incentives set to occur in the advanced economy. The 
rate of dirty output growth tails down with the upward trend in the dirty capital investment tax, 
achieves a minimum value that mirrors the peak in the investment tax on dirty capital and then 
adjusts upward to a steady state, zero growth position. The clean capital growth rate, in contrast, 
remains relatively constant over the simulated horizon. 
Fig. 1f compares the simulated consumption paths for the dirty good, the clean good, and the 
composite consumption commodity. The trends are qualitatively similar to the time paths for 
sectoral income.23 
The effect of various changes in the baseline parameter values are described in Fig. 2. These 
changes correspond to three different types of effects that favor dirty-sector development relative 
to clean-sector development: (i) dirty consumption is preferred to clean consumption ðrd ¼ 
1 � r ¼ 0:6Þ; (ii) dirty output is more productive than clean output ðA1d ¼ ð1:10ÞA1cÞ; and (iii) c 
dirty investment creates dirty capital more readily than does clean investment ðA3d ¼ ð1:01ÞA3cÞ:24 
Fig. 2a compares the time path for environmental quality under each of these three effects to the 
22 The environmental sink can be interpreted as an exhaustible resource in the developing economy. 
23 At a constant income tax, sectoral consumption is proportional to sectoral output in (11). 
24 For larger magnitude adjustments in these parameters, the model fails to converge to the long-run equilibrium 
values described above. 
(a) 
(b) 
Fig. 2. 
baseline calibration. The qualitative features of the development paths are similar in all cases to 
the baseline model and indicate a U-shaped time pattern for environmental quality over a period 
of monotonically increasing income. 
Fig. 2b compares time paths for the capital investment taxes. The time paths broadly illustrate 
the evolution of the optimal policies under favorable dirty-sector conditions, although we have 
made no attempt to restrict the regulatory structure to policies that levy capital investment taxes 
below the unit value. In all cases, the investment tax on clean capital remains fairly stable across 
the time horizon, but the optimal tax on dirty capital investment spikes upwards in a pronounced 
fashion relative to the baseline case. The notable feature of these time paths is that, under 
favorable conditions in the dirty sector, the upward revision in the tax on dirty capital during the 
EKC ampliﬁes the more modest adjustment from the baseline level that is required by each policy 
in the long run. 
4.3. The role of endogenous labor supply 
We have discussed three ingredients that are necessary to produce an EKC: (i) dirty 
output is bounded, (ii) clean output grows endogenously, (iii) and an increase in dirty 
capital reduces the rate of growth of clean goods. The most direct way to include these 
ingredients in a model is to specify a separate production externality in each sector and link 
each externality back to the dirty capital stock. Under exogenous labor supply, a model 
that introduces these ingredients directly would produce the EKC through precisely the same 
trade-off described here between the level effect and the growth effect. Endogenous labor supply is 
not qualitatively important for the EKC if environmental quality is a necessary input for both 
types of goods. 
Nonetheless, endogenous labor supply causes the EKC to emerge in situations where it 
otherwise would not under exogenous labor supply. For example, suppose the dirty sector 
represents manufacturing industries that rely on environmental inputs for production, whereas 
the clean sector represents service industries that do not. An EKC no longer occurs under 
exogenous labor supply. Capital employed in the manufacturing sector would generate pollution 
that bounds the output of manufactured goods, as required by condition (i), but pollution emitted 
by the manufacturing industries would now have no adverse implications for growth in the service 
industries, violating condition (iii). A model with exogenous labor would produce only a level 
effect and not a growth effect in this economy, and as a consequence, pollution would either rise 
monotonically in the advanced economy or else not occur at all. 
When environmental quality is a necessary input for only one type of good, the EKC can 
emerge under endogenous labor supply. Consider again the example of manufacturing and 
services. Under endogenous labor supply conditions, pollution emitted by the manufacturing 
industries reduces labor market productivity in the manufacturing sector, which results in a 
smaller equilibrium labor market allocation. To the extent that manufacturing and services 
compete for a common pool of labor, this labor market adjustment decreases equilibrium output 
in both the manufacturing sector and the service sector of the economy. Pollution now dampens 
the endogenous growth rate in the service sector indirectly through the labor market allocation, 
which satisﬁes condition (iii). Under endogenous labor supply, the economy meets all three 
necessary conditions for the EKC. 
Endogenous labor supply conditions also bound economic growth in cases where unbounded 
endogenous growth would otherwise occur. To see this, notice that if pollution commences in the 
manufacturing industries under exogenous labor supply, it never becomes optimal to clean it up, 
but the service sector nonetheless continues to grow endogenously in the long run. Under 
endogenous labor supply, these outcomes cannot simultaneously occur. Either the economy 
ultimately cleans up pollution to emphasize the long-run growth of services, which produces the 
EKC, or the economy fuels capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector to a point that stalls 
the endogenous growth of services. 
To see this scenario more concretely, consider the limiting case of the model in which labor 
supply is exogenous ðg-NÞ: Note that the EKC can emerge under exogenous labor supply 
when a separate production externality impacts each sector, because limg-N ej ¼ yj for j ¼ d; c: 
If both yd40 and yc40; then dirty output is bounded in (15), as required by condition 
(i), and dirty capital adversely affects the rate of clean output growth in (16), as required by 
condition (iii). If clean output growth occurs at a sufﬁciently high rate in the advanced economy, 
the EKC is produced whenever the level effect initially dominates the growth effect (in utility 
terms). However, notice that if yd ¼ 0 the dirty sector has the potential for unbounded output 
growth in (15), which violates condition (i), and if yc ¼ 0; dirty capital has no adverse implications 
for growth of clean output in (16), which violates condition (iii). Hence, the EKC cannot occur 
under exogenous labor supply when a production externality impacts only one sector of the 
economy. 
! " Under endogenous labor supply ðgoNÞ; the labor market equilibrium generates an additional 
1�afeedback mechanism for the EKC. If yj ¼ 0 in sector j; then ej ¼ yiri for iaj; j ¼ d; c: A gþa�1 
production externality in a single sector of the economy always works its way into both sectors 
through the adjustment in the labor market equilibrium, which simultaneously produces all three 
necessary conditions for the EKC. The EKC emerges in an economy with endogenous labor in 
cases where it otherwise would not if labor was supplied exogenously. 
5. Conclusion 
The socially optimal pattern of economic development under a production externality depends 
on a dynamic trade-off between two margins associated with investment in dirty capital. The 
accumulation of dirty capital produces a positive level effect on utility through its contribution to 
dirty consumption but adversely affects environmental quality and has negative implications for 
growth in the clean sector. For various parameterizations of the model, these margins adjust in a 
manner that directs the economy to a socially optimal development pattern consisting of an initial 
period of low capital stocks, in which dirty goods are emphasized, followed by a transition to 
clean goods at higher levels of capitalization. Numerical simulation of such a path reveals that the 
transitional dynamics involve a U-shaped pattern of environmental quality decline and recovery 
over a period of monotonically increasing income. 
In a second-best policy setting with endogenous labor supply, distortionary taxes produce an 
additional channel for the EKC to arise through intersectoral spillovers linked to equilibrium 
labor market participation. With endogenous labor supply, a negative production externality 
always involves both sectors of the economy, and this produces a dynamic tension between dirty-
sector consumption and clean-sector growth that is capable of generating non-monotonic time 
paths for the tax on dirty capital, for the stock of dirty capital, and for environmental quality. 
Ultimately, the relationship between optimal economic growth and the environment under a 
production externality depends on several features that determine the relative level of 
capitalization in the clean and dirty sectors of an advanced economy. These features include 
the size of the environmental effects introduced by dirty capital, the social discount rate, and the 
capacity of the environment to assimilate pollution in an initial development phase. If these 
features align to produce a sufﬁciently high level of clean output relative to dirty output as 
pollution begins to exceed its natural sinks, then the shift to clean technologies is immediate. If the 
level of clean output is sufﬁciently small relative to the level of dirty output, then the optimal 
development pattern fuels accumulation of dirty capital and degrades environmental quality to a 
level that crowds out endogenous growth in the clean sector and bounds economic output. Only 
for intermediate levels of relative clean and dirty capitalization does the EKC appear. 
Our model also shows that an EKC need not develop as per-capita income increases. Indeed, 
the model cautions against implementing myopic environmental policies that seek to ‘‘grow ﬁrst, 
then clean up later.’’ When a developing country emphasizes dirty techniques over clean 
techniques based on their greater potential for short-term output growth, this policy can 
ultimately halt endogenous growth in the economy at a level beneath the threshold where cleaning 
up pollution makes economic sense. This observation points to a potentially misleading focus in 
the empirical EKC literature on identifying a level of per-capita income that marks the turning 
point of the EKC. 
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